In this paper we present a dynamic macroeconomic model with stochastic quantity rationing. Trades take place in each period even when prices are not at their Walrasian level. Moving from one period to the next, prices and wages are adjusted according to the intensity of rationing, a reliable measure of which is obtained by means of stochastic rationing. A complete characterization of the typology of equilibria is given and dynamic adjustment equations are derived. From this it is evident that structural parameters such as the adjustment speed of prices, as well as government policy parameters, are decisive for the type of dynamics that emerges. In particular there is a tendency for nominal wage stickiness to stabilise the economy whereas high wage ‡exibility favours cyclical and irregular behaviour.
Introduction
Starting from the mid seventies the unemployment rate in the European Community experienced a substantial increase. Unemployment rates over 10% of the labor force since 1983 have been the rule in many countries even up to now. These high levels of unemployment are posing problems in almost all the countries of the European Union. Moreover unemployment is only one of several disequilibrium phenomena that seem to characterize many advanced economies for relevant periods of time. Capacity underutilization for ten years before the second world war and high in ‡ation levels in the eighties are other examples. 1 In spite of the importance of these issues, economic theory has struggled in providing satisfactory theoretical accounts. Many of the existing dynamic macroeconomic models, even though giving rise to valuable insights, show a number of weaknesses with respect to these facts. Models belonging to the competitive business cycle approach (e.g. Lucas-Prescott [1974] , Lucas [1975] ) study intertemporal allocation problems in a market clearing context assuming a representative agent maximizing his utility over an in…nite horizon. Their structure impedes being able to account for prices which are not at their Walrasian level in each period. On the other hand dynamic models based on Keynesian-type assumptions (e.g. Kaldor [1940] , Dana-Malgrange [1984] ) may generate rich and complex dynamic behavior, but usually they are not built on explicit micro foundations.
In the present paper we suggest an overlapping generations macroeconomic model which aims to avoid the above drawbacks. Its distinctive feature is that, although trades take place in every period, prices may not be at their Walrasian level. This non-tâtonnement approach makes it possible to investigate disequilibrium phenomena like underemployment, in ‡ation, excess productive capacities and, moreover, to provide a framework for the study of the e¤ectiveness of economic policies. More precisely, disequilibrium situations may arise because the adjustment of prices to market imbalances is not instantaneous but proceeds with …nite speed only; thus their functioning as an allocation device is imperfect, though not nil. As a consequence, quantity adjustments have to take place which complement prices in their task of making trades feasible. This appears to re ‡ect well the e¤ective functioning of many markets. Labor markets, at least in Europe, are the foremost example, but also product markets often show a high degree of price inertia and stickiness (for empirical accounts see Carlton [1986] and Bean [1994]) 2 .
The topic of this paper has been on the agenda of the …xed-price literature as developed in the seventies (Bénassy [1975] , Drèze [1975] , Malinvaud [1977] ), too. However, while it is true that that literature has obtained valuable results like the distinction of Keynesian from classical unemployment and the importance of feedback e¤ects of rationing constraints between di¤erent markets, it has not succeeded in producing a convincing modelling of a dynamic economy with Keynesian features. Its major drawback is that it has not been able to extend its analysis in a convincing way beyond the short-run static set-up. That would have required price adjustment but, as we shall argue, this is not possible to do satisfactorily in the standard …xed-price approach. In contrast, we do o¤er a dynamic analysis, building on the fact that, in many markets, quantity adjustments occur faster than price adjustments (Greenwald and Stiglitz [1989] ). To account formally for this asymmetry, and be able to work out its consequences most clearly, it is convenient to assume that, while quantities adjust within any period so as to produce a feasible allocation, prices are …xed during each period but are adjusted when the economy moves from one period to the next.
Although the idea just outlined is neither new nor complicated, it gives rise to two problems: how to …nd a consistent allocation when prices are not at their market clearing levels and how to de…ne a reasonable mechanism for the adjustment of prices. Regarding the …rst, it can be solved using the concept of temporary equilibrium with quantity rationing, developed for the case of deterministic rationing mainly by Drèze [1975] and Bénassy [1975] .
As far as the adjustment of prices is concerned, a natural idea is to relate it to the size of the dissatisfaction of agents with their (foregone) trades. At …rst sight it might appear that a measure for this could easily be obtained from a comparison of the desired trades in presence of rationing constraints, called e¤ective demands, with actual trades. In fact, Bénassy [1976 Bénassy [ , 1978 and Laroque [1981] , among others, have studied models in which the value of the aggregate excess demand, arising from Benassy's concept of e¤ective demand, is assumed as such a measure.
3 But, as has been pointed out by Grandmont [1977] , Green [1980] production function and of the demand function, by imperfect and asymmetric information and by risk aversion of order one (Weinrich [1997] ). Regarding wage rigidity, it has been derived for instance from insider-outsider arguments (Shaked and Sutton [1984] ); fairness (Hahn and Solow [1995, ch. 5] ), e¢ciency wages (Salop [1979] , Solow [1979] , Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984] , Weiss [1991] ) and uncertainty combined with imperfectly competitive markets (Holmes and Hutton [1996] ). See also the recent contribution by Bewley [2000] who found by means of interviews of a large number of businessmen that in recessions for …rms it is preferable to lay o¤ workers rather than to lower wages. 3 Bénassy's concept of e¤ective demand is based on the dual decision hypothesis (Clower [1965] ) and assumes that, in determining his e¤ective demand for any good, the agent takes into account all rationing constraints for all goods except that for the very good he is formulating 3 and Svensson [1980] , among others, this measure can hardly be considered reliable. In fact, their criticism applies to any measure derived from e¤ective demands based on deterministic rationing because in that case only non manipulable rationing is compatible with the existence of an equilibrium with rationing. But then agents do not have an incentive to express demands that exceed their expected transactions (which in equilibrium equal actual trades). Stochastic rationing, on the other hand, reconciles manipulable rationing with the existence of equilibrium (Weinrich [1984] ) and thus provides an incentive for rationed agents to express demands that exceed trades (see also Gale [1979 Gale [ , 1981 , Honkapohja and Ito [1985] and Weinrich [1988] ). 4 The structure of the model then is the following. In any period t prices and wages are …xed. An allocation is obtained by means of an equilibrium with stochastic manipulable rationing and exchange takes place. Then the economy moves on to period t + 1, prices are adjusted according to the excesses of e¤ective demands and supplies over actual trades in period t, prices remain …xed during period t + 1, an allocation takes place and so on. In this way, starting from any initial situation, we obtain a sequence of allocations and prices which represents the dynamic behavior of the economy. Such a sequence may converge, diverge, cycle or produce chaotic attractors. Moreover, even when it converges, the resulting limit allocation is not necessarily a Walrasian steady state but may be a quasi-stationary state with permanent rationing (underemployment or capacity underutilization) and nominal price adjustment (but constant relative prices).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section two we present the model and derive the behavior of consumers, producers and government under stochastic manipulable rationing. Section three introduces temporary equilibrium with rationing and the di¤erent equilibrium regimes (Keynesian and classical unemployment, in ‡ation and underconsumption) whereas in section four we derive the partitioning of the price and wage space according to the type of equilibrium with rationing that any price-wage combination gives rise to. This prepares the …eld for the dynamic analysis to which we turn in section …ve and where we de…ne the demand for. This means that, if there are n goods, he has to solve n optimization problems. 4 More precisely, manipulable and deterministic rationing is not compatible with the existence of an equilibrium because, in presence of manipulable rationing constraints, all agents have an incentive to exaggerate their intended transactions in such a way so as to realize exactly their desired transactions. But since this is impossible, rationing has to become more and more restrictive and transaction proposals grow unbounded. This is not the case with stochastic rationing because, due to uncertainty, an agent who makes too large a transaction o¤er cannot be sure that he will not be "taken by his word" and required to realize the demand or supply that he expressed. But this may be extremely unpleasant which is why, with stochastic rationing, transaction o¤ers remain bounded. This point will be taken up again and illustrated in section 3.
the respective adjustment equations. In section six we present simulation results and section seven contains concluding remarks. Four appendices contain proofs of the more technical results and the equations of the dynamic system on which the simulation program is based.
The Model
We consider an economy in which there are both a private sector (composed of consumers and …rms) and a public sector (government). The consumption sector has an overlapping generations structure in which there are 2n identical agents living for two periods (n young and n old) who o¤er labor when young and consume the produced good in both periods. The production sector is represented by n 0 identical …rms, characterized by an atemporal production function whose only input is labor. The government levies a proportional tax on …rms' pro…ts to …nance its expenditure for goods. Nevertheless, budget de…cits and surpluses may arise and are made possible by means of money creation or destruction.
Timing of the Model
The time structure of the model is depicted in Figure 2 .1. In period t ¡ 1 producers obtain an aggregate pro…t of ¦ t¡1 , distributed at the beginning of period t in part as tax to the government (tax¦ t¡1 ) and in part to young consumers ((1 ¡ tax) ¦ t¡1 ), where 0 · tax · 1. Also at the beginning of period t old consumers hold a quantity of money M t , consisting of savings generated in period t ¡ 1: In other words, young households use money as a means of transfer of purchasing power between periods. Since consumption choices of young consumers may be rationed, they are possibly forced to hold unwanted savings in the form of money.
Let X t denote the quantity of the good purchased by young consumers in period t, p t its price, w t the nominal wage and L t the quantity of labor. Then
Denoting with G the quantity of goods purchased by the government and taking into account that old households want to consume all their money holdings in period t, the aggregate consumption of young and old households and the government is
as the variation in the money stock held by producers and denoting with ¢M C t the one referring to consumers, the following standard accounting identity obtains: Setting m t = M t =p t , µ t = p t+1 =p t and ¼ t = ¦ t¡1 =p t , we obtain the following dynamic equation in the real money stock and real pro…ts:
The Consumption Sector
In his …rst period of life each consumer born at t is endowed with labor`s and the amount of money (1 ¡ tax) ¦ t¡1 =n. His utility arises from consumption in both periods and is given by u (x t ; x t+1 ) = x h t x 1¡h t+1 ; 0 < h < 1: In taking any decision the young household has to meet the following constraints:
; i = 0; 1
n denote the consumer's real wealth when he is employed and unemployed, respectively. Implicit in this formulation is that rationing on the labor market is of type all-or-nothing and that the labor market is visited before the goods market.
On the goods market the young household may be rationed according to the following stochastic rule:
with prob.°d t 0 with prob. 1 ¡°d t where x d t is the quantity demanded and°d t 2 [0; 1] a rationing coe¢cient which the household perceives as given but which will be determined in equilibrium. From this follows that the expected value of x t is°d t x d t . In particular this means that rationing is manipulable.
Denoting with µ e t the expected relative price for consumption in period t + 1, x di t ; i = 0; 1; is obtained by maximizing the agent's expected utility°d t x h t
In particular, the young consumer's e¤ective demand is independent both of°d t and of µ e t . It does depend, however, on the real income ! i t and hence on whether the consumer has been employed. Since there is 0/1-rationing on the goods market, the Cobb-Douglas form of the utility function implies that a young consumer rationed on the goods market derives no utility from consuming in the second period. This could be easily changed by assuming u (x t ; x t+1 ) = (
where x · G=n is a small …xed subsistance consumption provided for free by the government. Then expected utility would be°d t (
which, as h and x are …xed, would not change anything substantial.
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The aggregate supply of labor is L s = n`s: Denoting with L d t the aggregate demand of labor and with¸s t = min
the fraction of young consumers that will be employed, the aggregate demand of goods of young consumers is
The total e¤ective aggregate demand of the consumption sector is then obtained by adding old consumers' aggregate demand m t and government demand G:
where ® t = w t =p t denotes the real wage:
In order to provide a geometric characterization which will be crucial in studying the temporary equilibrium regimes we de…ne the locus
and, following Honkapohja-Ito [1985] , refer to it as the young consumers' o¤er curve. 6 It represents the aggregate transaction o¤ers of the young consumers for di¤erent values of¸s (holding all other arguments in the function X d (¢) …xed): From this locus we obtain, for any given m and G, the consumption sector's o¤er curve as
Similarly, the locus of young consumers' expected aggregate transactions is
and it can be partitioned in the following way:
We will refer to these loci as the young consumers' trade curves whereas the consumption sector's trade curves are given by H T + f(0; m + G)g ; T 2 fK; I; C; U g : They are shown in Figure 2 .2.
We use the terminology o¤er curve because it has been established so in the literature. Of course, that does not mean that households act as suppliers on all markets.
7 For two sets A and B, x 2 A + B i¤ x = a + b for some a 2 A and b 2 B. 8 Notice that the aggregate o¤er and trade curves are deterministic concepts although, at the individuel level, rationing is stochastic. This is not a contradiction but can be easily understood thinking of, for example, a situation in which two workers apply for the same job at a …rm. The "transaction level" will be one worker and is thus deterministic, but any individual worker may think to have a 50% chance of being assumed. 
The Production Sector
Each of the n 0 identical …rms uses an atemporal production function y t = f (`t) : As with consumers, …rms too may be rationed, by means of a rationing mechanism analogue to that assumed for the consumption sector.
Denoting the single …rm's e¤ective demand of labor by`d t ; the quantity of labor e¤ectively transacted is`t = ½`d t ; with prob.¸d t 0; with prob. 1 ¡¸d t where¸d t 2 [0; 1] : It is obvious that E`t =¸d t`d t : On the goods market the rationing rule is assumed to be
where ¾ 2 (0; 1) ;°s t 2 [0; 1] and d t = (°s t ¡ ¾°s t ) = (1 ¡ ¾°s t ) : ¾ is a …xed parameter of the mechanism whereas¸d t and°s t are perceived rationing coe¢cients taken as given by the …rm the e¤ective value of which will be determined in equilibrium. The de…nition of d t implies that Ey t =°s t y s The e¤ective demand`d t =`d (°s t ; ® t ) is obtained from the …rm's expected pro…t maximization problem
while its e¤ective supply is y
The upper bound on labor demand re ‡ects the fact that the …rm must be prepared to …nance labor service purchases even if rationed on the goods market (since the labor market is visited …rst it will know whether it is rationed on the goods market only after it has hired labor). In general the solution depends on this constraint but if we assume that
The aggregate labor demand is 
These curves are shown in Figure 2 .3.
Temporary Equilibrium Allocations
For any given period t we can now describe a feasible allocation as a temporary equilibrium with rationing as follows.
.3: Producers' trade curves. (
Conditions (1) and (2) require that expected aggregate transactions balance. This means that all agents have correct perceptions of the rationing coe¢cients. Equations (3) formalize the short-side rule according to which at most one side on each market is rationed. The meaning of the coe¢cients ± t and " t is that also old households and/or the government can be rationed. However, according to condition (4) this may occur only after young households have been rationed (to zero).
In Appendix 2 we show the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for any given (® t ; ¼ t ; m t ; G; tax). This implies that the equilibrium levels on the labor and the goods market are well-de…ned functions L (® t ; ¼ t ; m t ; G; tax) and Y (® t ; ¼ t ; m t ; G; tax) :
As shown in the table below it is possible to distinguish di¤erent types of equilibrium according to which market sides are rationed: excess supply on both markets is called Keynesian Unemployment [K], excess demand on both markets Repressed In ‡ation [I], excess supply on the labor market and excess demand on the goods market Classical Unemployment [C] and excess demand on the labor market with excess supply on the goods market Underconsumption [U ].
Of course there are further intermediate cases which, however, can be considered as limiting cases of the above ones. In particular, when all the rationing coe¢cients are equal to one, we are in a Walrasian Equilibrium. Using the consumption and the production sectors' trade and o¤er curves it is possible to analyze the various equilibrium regimes in more detail. We do this here for the case of Keynesian Unemployment only. This type of equilibrium involves rationing of households on the labor market and of …rms on the goods market. It is given by a pair (¸s t ;°s t ) such that
(where we have suppressed all arguments that are not rationing coe¢cients). Recalling the de…nition of the trade curves
Thus ¡ L t ; Y t ¢ is given by the intersection of the trade curves H 
It follows that¸s t = L t =L s ;°s t = Y t =Y s t and¸d t =°d t = 1 (= ± t = " t ) ; which are just the values that led households and …rms to express their respective transaction o¤ers. Thus their expectations regarding these rationing coe¢cients are con…rmed. Nevertheless, due to the randomness in rationing at an individual agent's level, e¤ective aggregate demands and supplies of rationed agents exceed their actual transactions.
Moreover, as indicated earlier, these excesses can be used to get an indicator of the strength of rationing. Since there is zero-one rationing on the labor market,
s is the ratio of the number of unemployed workers and the total number of young households. Regarding the goods market, in a Kequilibrium Y t ¡°s t Y s (1;°s t ) = 0, and therefore
So a decrease in Y t (for example due to a reduction of government spending), and thus an aggravation of the shortage of aggregate demand for …rms' goods, is unambiguously related to an increase in 1 ¡°s t which can therefore be interpreted as a measure of the strength of rationing on the goods market. A similar reasoning justi…es the use as rationing measures
Figure 3.2: Repressed In ‡ation Equilibrium of the terms 1 ¡¸d t and 1 ¡°d t in the other equilibrium regimes. The illustration of the other temporary equilibrium regimes works similarly except for the fact that under repressed in ‡ation and classical unemployment old agents and/or the government may be rationed, too. This is shown in Figure 3 .2 for the case of repressed in ‡ation and rationing of the old agents.
Representation of Equilibrium Regimes
Given the existence and uniqueness of temporary equilibrium (see Appendix 2) we can, holding all other variables …xed, partition the set R 3 + of all combinations of real wage ® t ; real pro…ts ¼ t and real money stock m t according to the type of equilibrium they give rise to. Formally, we have a map (® t ; ¼ t ; m t ) 7 ! T 2 fK; I; C; Ug : Holding also nominal money M and nominal pro…ts ¦ parametrically …xed, we can furthermore derive from this a map (p t ; w t ) 7 ! (w t =p t ; ¦=p t ; M=p t ) 7 ! T which is illustrated in Figure 4 .1 and shows the partitioning of p t ¡ w t ¡plane in di¤erent regimes of types of equilibrium.
9 From this diagram, in principle familiar 9 The arrows in Fig. 4 .1 will be explained later. from the literature, 10 it can be seen that too high a goods price and a nominal wage give rise to a state of Keynesian unemployment and hence excess supply on both markets, even if the real wage is at its Walrasian level. If the real wage is too high, Classical unemployment occurs whereas in the opposite case a situation of repressed in ‡ation obtains. Finally note that the Underconsumption regime (U) is degenerate: it coincides with the borderline between K and I:
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The …gure di¤ers from what is shown in the literature with respect to the slope of the borderline between regimes K and I: there it is negative whereas here it is positive. To see this, consider (p t ; w t ) such that T (w t =p t ; ¦=p t ; M=p t ) = U = K c \ I c . 12 Then consumers are not rationed and, writing (w t =p t ; ¦=p t ; M=p t ) = (®; ¼; m), the corresponding equilibrium must satisfy the following conditions:
; the left hand 10 See for instance Malinvaud [1977] and Muellbauer and Portes [1978] . 11 This is due to the fact that the trade curve F U is one-dimensional (Lemma 2 in Appendix 1) and derives from our choice of the production function, the assumption that the labor market opens before the goods market and the absence of an intertemporal optimization. Otherwise F U might be an area and the equilibrium non-unique (see Honkapohja and Ito [1985] ). 12 S c indicates the closure of the set S.
side of the second equation is (®=b) L s whereas the right hand side can be written
or, equivalently,
Multiplying by p t we obtain the frontier K ¡ I as
It has positive slope since hb < 1: The frontiers K ¡ C and C ¡ I can be derived analogously.
Dynamics
So far our analysis has been essentially static. For any given vector (® t ; ¼ t ; m t ; G; tax) we have described a feasible allocation in terms of a temporary equilibrium with rationing. Moreover we have found a way to measure, by means of the rationing coe¢cients¸s t ;¸d t ;°s t and°d t associated to any equilibrium allocation, the strength of rationing on the various market sides: This allows us now to extend our framework to a dynamic analysis.
To this end we must link successive periods one to another. This link will of course be given by the adjustment of prices but also by the changes in the real stock of money and in real pro…ts. Regarding the latter, this is automatic since by de…nition of these variables
and
hold.
13 13 Notice that, if ± t is smaller than one, then, by the ranking of rationing assumed, X t = 0 and thus M t+1 = (1 ¡ tax) ¦ t¡1 + w t L t : This is a very arti…cial situation but, to be consistent, we have to accept that the part 1¡± t of M t which the old households cannot spend is lost. Likewise " t · 1, which takes account of the possibility of government rationing, is included mainly for consistency reasons. This explains also the slight di¤erence in equations (2.1) and (5.1).
Regarding the adjustment of the goods price and the nominal wage we follow the standard hypothesis that, whenever an excess of demand (supply) is observed, the corresponding price or wage rises (falls). In terms of the rationing coe¢cients observed in period t, this amounts to p t+1 < p t ,°s t < 1; p t+1 > p t ,°d t < 1; w t+1 < w t ,¸s t < 1; w t+1 > w t ,¸d t < 1 and is illustrated by the arrows in Figure 4 .1. More precisely, in our simulation model we will write these adjustments as
where ¹ 1 ; ¹ 2 ; º 1 and º 2 are nonnegative parameters for the "speeds" of adjustment (for a general formulation of the adjustment mechanism as well as a further speci…c example of it see Appendix 3). 14 This formalizes that the size of price and wage adjustment depends on the strength of rationing and allows us to encompass a wide variety of circumstances. For example, wage ‡exibility upwards greater than downwards is obtained whenever º 2 > º 1 and wage rigidity downwards corresponds to º 1 = 0:
15 From the adjustment of nominal prices we obtain the one for the real wage as
14 We use "speed" of adjustment although, literally speaking, with a non linear mechanism, a speed in this discrete model would be the di¤erence between p t+1 and p t or between w t+1 and w t . However, that di¤erence and the size of the corresponding parameter ¹ 1 ; ¹ 2 ; º 1 or º 2 are positively related which is why we use for simplicity this terminology. 15 A subtle point may be noted here. On the borderline K ¡ I we have¸s =°d = 1; buţ d°s < 1: However,¸d and°s are not uniquely determined. The two limiting cases are¸d = 1 and°s < 1; in which the price is adjusted whereas the wage is una¤ected, and¸d < 1 and°s = 1 which means that only the wage is adjusted. Only when both¸d < 1 and°s < 1 price and wage change simultaneously. This indeterminacy is not so problematic, however, because, for any conceivable values of¸d and°s, the price will never increase and the wage never decrease. This, and the positive slope of the borderline K ¡ I (in the p ¡ w plane), imply that unambiguously (p t+1 ; w t+1 ) 2 K for all (p t ; w t ) 2 K c \ I c ; no matter what the choice of¸d and°s is. Note also that this is not true for comparable models with deterministic rationing like Malinvaud [1977] and Muellbauer and Portes [1978] , because there the frontier between K and I is downward sloping.
whereas the growth factor of the price level µ t = p t+1 =p t is given by
6. Numerical Analysis
The economic model introduced in the previous sections represents a non-linear dynamical system that cannot be studied with analytical tools only. This is due to the fact that the system is three-dimensional, with state variables ® t ; m t and ¼ t : Moreover, since there are three nondegenerate equilibrium regimes, the overall dynamic system can be viewed as being composed of three subsystems each of which may become e¤ective through endogenous regime switching. (The complete equations of these systems are given in Appendix 4.) In order to get some insights in these dynamics we are reporting numerical simulations using programs developed for this paper's purposes based on the packages GAUSS and MACRODYN 16 . The basic parameter set speci…es values for the technological coe¢cients (a and b), the exponent of the utility function (h), the labor supply (L s ) and the total number of producers in the economy (n 0 ), for the price adjustment speeds downward and upward (respectively ¹ 1 and ¹ 2 ) and the corresponding wage adjustment speeds (º 1 and º 2 ). We also have to specify initial values for the real wage, real money stock and real pro…t level (® 0 ; m 0 and ¼ 0 ) and values for the government policy parameters (G and tax):
Starting from the following parameter values corresponding to a stationary Walrasian equilibrium a = 1 b = 0:85 h = 0:5 L s = 100 n 0 = 100 ® 0 = 0:85 m 0 = 46:25 ¼ 0 = 15 G = 7:5 tax = 0:5 we …rst address the question of the impact of changes in the downward speed of adjustment of the wage rate. To this end we consider a reduction in the initial money stock to m 0 = 40; allowing for an adjustment of the price in both directions (¹ 1 = ¹ 2 = 0:4) but imposing downward wage rigidity (º 1 = 0; º 2 = 0:4). As can be seen from Figure 6 .1, the restrictive money shock gives rise to a transitional phase of unemployment before the system returns to a Walrasian equilibrium with full employment. The unemployment phase can be shortened by allowing for downward wage ‡exibility (as was to be expected from textbook theory). This is shown in Figure 6 .2 where º 1 has been changed to 0:1. However, Figure 6 .3, where º 1 = 0:2; suggests that further increasing this downward ‡exibility results in irregular behavior with frequently high unemployment rates.
To see which downward wage ‡exibility is "too much" we can consider the bifurcation diagram in Figure 6 .4. It reveals that the system is stable with convergence to full employment for all º 1 smaller than 0.14 whereas from that value on until 0.28 its behavior is irregular or cyclical . For speeds of adjustment still bigger there results divergence.
The attractor in Figure 6 .5, drawn for º 1 = 0:2; con…rms that, in addition to regular periodic behavior, the dynamical system can also produce very complicated patterns in the form of quasi-periodic or even chaotic behavior. Complex and strange geometric objects have been found by deviating from the standard parameter set in some of the relevant parameters (initial conditions, technological coe¢cients, government policy instruments). Moreover it emerges quite clearly that cycles of di¤erent order co-exist for the same parameter set, but for di¤er-ent initial conditions. Therefore, a minor variation in the initial state can drive the system to a completely di¤erent cycle or, in other words, there is sensitive dependence of the order of a cycle on initial conditions. Figure 6 :6 shows a further attractor in the diagram plotting the wage in ‡ation rate against the unemployment rate. It in fact is a Phillips curve which, by very construction, is a long-run phenomenon. Notice, however, that it would be wrong to interprete this Phillips curve as a policy instrument in terms of a trade-o¤ between unemployment and in ‡ation. Any point on the curve is but one element of a trajectory of pairs of rates of unemployment and wage in ‡ation, and successive points of this trajectory may lie far away one from the other. Thus, even if the government tried to select a speci…c point on the curve in one period, in the next period already the system may go to a very di¤erent point on the curve.
To understand better how the curve comes about, we can look at the diagrams in the second row of charts of Figure 6 .3. The left-hand chart plots the price for periods 1 to 100. Until about period 50 the price does not change very much but then it starts to alternatingly increase and decrease quite substantially. The right-hand chart depicts the trajectory of price and wage couples. It starts out in Figure 6 .1: The time series in the …gure show the emergence of transitional unemployment when the real stock of money is reduced from the Walrasian equilibrium level of 46.25 to 40 and the coe¢cients for the adjustment of the goods price and the nominal wage are respectively ¹ 1 = ¹ 2 = 0:4 and º 1 = 0; º 2 = 0:4. 20 Figure 6 .2: The unemployment phase is shortened when downward wage ‡exibility is allowed. The parameter set is the same considered in the previous …gure, except that now it is º 1 = 0:1: Figure 6 .3: The behavior of the system becomes highly irregular when the downward wage ‡exibility increases. In the simulation represented here º 1 is 0:2: Figure 6 .4: The bifurcation diagram shows that for values of º 1 smaller than 0:14 the system converges, but for higher downward ‡exibility it displays a seemingly irregular behavior. the lower left angle and then has a tendency to move upwards and to the right. If, in a given period, the economy …nds itself in a state of Keynesian unemployment, both the price and the wage are decreased, whereas the opposite is true in a state of repressed in ‡ation. Furthermore, in a state of classical unemployment the price increases but the wage diminishes. Therefore the chart displaying price and wage couples shows that the economy visits all three types of equilibria along its trajectory. From the chart displaying employment, on the other hand, it is obvious that unemployment rates may vary substantially and therefore the points on the Phillips curve may jump consirably from one period to the next. Of particular interest in the context of our macroeconomic model is the impact of variations in the values of the government policy instruments G and tax:
In investigating this we make use of a new technical tool, called cyclogram, and developed by Lohmann and Wenzelburger [1996] . It provides a concise visualization technique and permits to establish a relationship between the values of the relevant parameters and the structure of the resulting dynamics (although it is not able to distinguish between regular quasi-periodic behavior and "true" chaotic motion)
17 . More precisely, Figure 6 .7 displays two cyclograms for º 1 = 0 and º 1 = 0:1; respectively, where the color attached to each point (G; tax) in the rectangle [0:75; 14:25] £ [0:05; 0:95] re ‡ects a certain type of dynamics. Points on the diagonal correspond to stationary (but not necessarily stable) Walrasian states. All points above the diagonal give rise to convergence and more precisely to quasistationary states (i.e. the goods price and the nominal wage are adjusted but the real wage is constant) with Keynesian unemployment. Thus permanent unemployment is possible although there is price and wage ‡exibility.
To support our claim that the quasi-stationary states we …nd are of a Keynesian type we may look at the bifurcation diagram in Figure 6 .8, obtained for the same parameter set as in the …rst cyclogram shown in Figure 6 .7 by setting tax = 0:5: For values of G smaller than 7.5 (the Walrasian value), the economy converges to quasi-stationary states with unemployment. This is consistent with the convergent behaviour shown by the cyclogram for points above the diagonal. Both diagrams …t nicely with economic intuition. They show that, as expected from textbook theory, an expansionary …scal policy (even holding constant the tax rate and changing only public expenditure) can help driving the economy towards full employment. However, a too expansionary …scal policy can prove to be destabilizing and give rise to highly cyclical and irregular dynamic behaviour, and this is a feature that has to be added to the risk of in ‡ation traditionally associated with expansionary policy measures.
Cyclograms in the G ¡ tax plane as above may potentially prove to be useful economic policy tools. It is conceivable that, in an extended model, it would be possible to calibrate the parameters of the model and to apply it to discuss the implications of di¤erent …scal policies. However, some caution would be needed. As is clear from the discussion above, the behaviour of the economy may become highly irregular just past the Walrasian equilibria on the diagonal.Thus an attempt to "tune" the economy to full employment may result counterproductive and, on the contrary, to keep it at some small level of unemployment may be preferable! Coming back to quasi-stationary Keynesian states, their existence can be explained economically as follows. In a state of Keynesian unemployment there is excess supply on both markets. Therefore both the goods price and the nominal wage diminish. However, if both decrease in the same measure, the real wage remains constant. If, in addition, there is a government balance surplus, the money stock decreases. If this decrease is proportional to the one in price and wage, the real stock of money held by consumers does not change. Thus, it is possible that in addition to the real wage also the real wealth of households remains constant or, in other words, there is no real-balance e¤ect. In these circumstances, no agent has an incentive to modify his decisions relative to the ones taken in the previous bifurcation diagrams, when the change in the behavior of state variables is plotted. period.Therefore, the state of the economy is stationary with respect to its real variables, although the nominal ones do change. This shows that the ‡exibility of prices and wages per se is not su¢cient to overcome situations of market imbalances; it is due to the spillover e¤ects between the labour and the consumption goods market, and could not have been obtained in partial equilibrium models.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have presented a dynamic macroeconomic model possessing three main features: it is built on …rst principles like optimizing behavior of all agents, it allows agents to trade also when prices are not market clearing and it gives rise to complex dynamics. More precisely we have adopted a non-tâtonnement approach involving temporary equilibria with stochastic quantity rationing and price adjustment between successive equilibria. In this way we have obtained a process which allows us to describe consistent allocations in every period but which at the same time obeys a well de…ned dynamics.
While the resulting dynamic system is too complex to be completely understood by means of analytical tools only, we have been able to shed some light on it using simulations in the form of time series, bifurcation diagrams, attractors and cyclograms. From these it is clear that a large variety of dynamic phenomena can be obtained, as for example a Phillips curve as an attractor. On the one hand the model shows a behavior familiar from textbook economics. This tends to be the case for small speeds of the adjustment of prices and, in particular, of the nominal wage. For high speeds, on the other hand, there is typically divergence whereas for intermediate speeds it is not di¢cult to obtain irregular and possibly chaotic behavior. As a by-product, we have been able to generate a Phillips-curve as the image of an attractor. Unfortunately, for three-dimensional systems with endogenous regime switching as the one presented in this paper there do not yet appear to exist su¢cient mathematical results to decide this issue analytically.
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In the absence of such analytical results cyclograms have shown to be useful tools as they indicate for any chosen parameter set the type of dynamics that is related to it. From this we have seen that there are parameter con…gurations for which the model's structural dynamic behavior is very sensitive to the choice of economic policy instruments. Moreover it is clear from the simulations that there exist parameter con…gurations for which the economic system gets stuck in quasistationary states that involve rationing -permanent unemployment or permanent capacity underutilization -although both the goods price and the nominal wage are ‡exible.
Moreover the inequalities
: From this follows
which proves our claim. ¥ Lemma 2.When the production function is f (`) = a`b; with a > 0 and 0 < b · 1 ¡ ¾; the producers' trade curves are given by
from any producer's optimizing behavior, and thus
Appendix 2: Existence and Uniqueness of Temporary Equilibrium
We show existence and uniqueness of a temporary equilibrium allocation for any given list of parameters (® t ; ¼ t ; m t ; G; tax) by means of the trade curves introduced in section two. From their de…nition follows that a pair ¡ L; Y ¢ 2 R 2 + is a temporary equilibrium allocation if and only if it is an element of the set
Here S c indicates the closure of the set S. Note that equilibria of type U do not appear as they can be seen as limiting cases of K-as well as of I-type equilibria.
To show that Z is not empty we consider …rst the locus ³ H Since the functions L (¢) and Y (¢) are well de…ned and positive, an equilibrium always exists. Uniqueness follows from the linearity of ¡ t (¢) and ¢ t (¢) :
The dynamic system is given by three di¤erent subsystems, one for each of the equilibrium types K; I and C; and endogenous regime switching. For given (G; tax) ; any list (® t ; ¼ t ; m t ) gives rise to a uniquely determined equilibrium allocation 
When L t = e L (¢) ; the K-subsystem applies whereas when L t = L d (¢) or L s ; the systems associated to the types C or I; respectively, are the ones to be used. Regime switching may occur because ¡ L t ; Y t ¢ may be of type T 2 fK; I; Cg and ¡ L t+1 ; Y t+1 ¢ of type T 0 6 = T: Regarding the subsystems, they are the following. 
Keynesian unemployment system
Classical Unemployment System 
The underconsumption case is not represented with an own dynamical system because choosing°s t =°s t¸d t and¸d t = 1 it can be treated as a special case of the Keynesian case.
